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     1 Introduction
Horizontal mergers impact consumers, competitors and even rms of vertically related
sectors (upstream suppliers or downstream customers). Besides the direct eect of mergers
on the transfers between industries or between rms and consumers, the evolution of the
market structure in an industry may impact that of the vertically related sectors, for instance
by aecting the incentives to merge in these sectors.
Although this indirect eect is crucial for competition policy, very little literature has been
devoted to assessing its impact. In the E.U. and the U.S., Competition Authorities generally
consider a merger as less harmful when the demand stems from suciently concentrated
rms: the underlying idea is that buyers' market power will translate into bargaining power
towards their suppliers. A stream of literature has developed this theme since the seminal
work of Galbraith (1952).1 However, a more detailed analysis of the eect of the vertical
position of rms on their incentives to merge and on the welfare consequences of mergers is
necessary.
Some explanations have been suggested for possible dierences in merger incentives at
dierent levels of a vertical chain. Inderst and Wey (2003) explore the motivations for hori-
zontal mergers in a bilateral duopoly when pricing behavior on the nal good market is not
aected (i.e. industry prots are invariant to the choice of market structure). By contrast,
in a successive Cournot oligopoly with linear wholesale pricing, market concentration at each
level aects demand and prices: when mergers induce size eects, Allain and Souam (2006)
show that, ceteris paribus, a merger in one sector reduces the incentives to merge in the
other sector. In a similar framework, but without size eects, Ziss (2005) shows that, when
the upstream marginal cost and the degree of concavity of nal demand are constant, the
protability of a horizontal merger is the same, ceteris paribus, in both sectors.
The aim of the present note is to generalize some results of Ziss (2005) and Allain and
Souam (2006) with an elastic input supply function in the upstream market and an elastic
nal demand. Our rst contribution is to compare the protability of mergers in the two
sectors. We characterize conditions on the concavities of the input supply function and the
nal demand function such that an upstream merger is more protable than a downstream
merger (for the same number of rms upstream and downstream, and the same number of
merging rms). Our second contribution consists in analyzing the impact of a merger in one
industry on the joint prot in the other industry. With an inelastic input supply function,
Allain and Souam (2006) show that, ceteris paribus, the losses incurred by downstream rms
due to a merger in the upstream sector are worse than the losses incurred by upstream rms
due to a merger downstream. As a consequence, even though mergers are more protable
downstream than upstream, they also are more harmful to welfare when they occur among
upstream rms. Here we extend this result when the input supply function is elastic and
1The impact of horizontal market structure on the bargaining power of the rms with their vertical
partners has been studied in dierent frameworks, for instance Horn and Wolinsky (1988) with exclusive
contracts, Fumagalli and Motta (2001) with two-part taris, von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and
Waterson (1997) in a Nash bargaining framework and Inderst and Wey (2003) in a bilateral oligopoly. Ziss
(2005) and Allain and Souam (2006) test the countervailing power hypothesis in a market framework.
1show that in some cases upstream losses may become worse than downstream losses.
2 The model
We consider a successive oligopoly model where rms within each industry compete
 a la Cournot. A homogeneous good is produced by m upstream rms, which compete in
quantities. These producers sell their good in an intermediate market to n downstream rms,
which transform it into a nal good that they sell to nal consumers. The downstream rms
also compete  a la Cournot. Vertical restrictions are not allowed. The contract governing
trade between the two stages of production is linear and the wholesale price is determined
by the market clearing condition on the intermediate market. We assume that, at each level
of the vertical chain, the rms only support supplying costs denoted wU and wD:
More precisely, the underlying game is the following.2
Stage 1: The upstream rms j 2 f1;:::;mg simultaneously commit to produce a quantity
qU
j of intermediate good. Upstream technology is as follows: each rm transforms one unit
of input into one unit of intermediate good, the only cost is the input price wU(Q) (known
by all). The upstream rms put their production on the intermediate market.
Stage 2: In the intermediate market, a market maker sets a (public) wholesale price wD
at which he buys the whole quantity produced by upstream rms, and at which he commits
to supply the demand addressed by the downstream rms.
Stage 3: The downstream rms i 2 f1;:::;ng simultaneously express their demands
qD
i for the intermediate good. Transactions are done between the market maker and the
downstream rms, which subsequently transform the good and sell it (simultaneously) to
the nal consumers. Downstream technology is as follows: each rm transforms one unit of
intermediate good into one unit of output, the only cost is the input price wD.
The objective functions of the players are the following. The rms maximize their prots
and the market maker minimizes the absolute value of the dierence between the supply









i )2. We assume the market
maker to be benevolent and not paid (as, for instance, the walrasian auctioneer). Finally,
we assume that, when demand at the intermediate level exceeds supply, the market maker
has to buy the excess on an external market not available to the downstream rms. This
implies that the rms are never rationed.3
The downstream inverse demand function P(Q) is twice continuously dierentiable, and
decreasing in the total quantity supplied, Q. Throughout the paper we denote fx the partial
derivative of function f w.r.t. x: We dene D(Q)  Q
PQQ(Q)
PQ(Q)
the degree of concavity of
the downstream demand.
2Although this model is relatively standard in the literature on vertical relationships (cf. Salinger, 1988),
the game and necessary assumptions are seldom formally presented.
3This point guarantees the existence and the uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole
game solved as usual by backward induction.
2A new feature introduced by this paper is the assumption that the input price at the
upstream level wU(Q) is a decreasing function of the total quantity of good sold to the
upstream rms (i.e. wU





the degree of concavity of the
upstream input supply function. This reects the fact that the upstream rms may also be
supplied by strategic rms in an imperfectly competitive industry.4 Finally, we assume that
D(Q) >  2. This implies that the marginal revenue at the downstream level is decreasing
and guarantees that the second order condition of the two-level Cournot model is veried
for every market structure.5





i and that of upstream





j . Note that each prot depends on the market structure
on both the upstream and downstream markets.
We solve the game by backward induction. In stage 3 the F.O.C yields P(Q)   wD +
P 0(Q)qD
i = 0 for i = 1;:::;n. At the symmetric equilibrium, the wholesale price on the
intermediate market is thus given by:
w





This condition implicitly denes the wholesale demand function faced by the upstream
rms.
3 Comparing merger protability in the upstream
and downstream sectors
Our rst aim is to compare the protability of mergers at both levels of the vertical chain.
As in Salant et al. (1983) or Farrell and Shapiro (1990), we consider that a merged rm
is similar to its competitors: competition remains symmetric after a merger. A merger of
s rms is thus said to be protable if the post merger prot of the merged rm (weakly)
exceeds the sum of the pre merger prots of the insiders, i.e. if and only if
D(m;n s+1)
D(m;n)  s,
while a merger of s upstream rms is protable if and only if
U(m s+1;n)
U(m;n)  s. We therefore
dene, for each merger in any sector, the protability ratio as the ratio of the post-merger
prot of the merged rm to the pre-merger prot of one insider. We compare these prot
ratios in order to determine in which sector (upstream or downstream) the merger of s rms
is more protable. We assume that the number of rms in an industry can be treated as a
continuous variable. The prot ratios may thus be written as follows:




















4We also consider the case wU
Q > 0 and discuss how this assumption aects our results.
5Cf. Fauli-Oller [1997] and Ziss [2005].
3Using the techniques developed by Fauli-Oller (1997) and Ziss (2005), we express these
ratios as functions of the degree of concavity of the dierent demand functions (see Appendix








n+1+D(Q) is the degree of concavity of the inverse
intermediate demand function (or wholesale price) wD.














represents the degree of concavity of the
dierence between the wholesale price paid by downstream rms and the input price
paid by the upstream rms.
A simple case gives a rst insight of the relative protability of upstream and downstream
mergers. Consider the symmetric case where the number of rms is initially the same in
both sectors (m = n), and assume that the nal demand and the input supply function have
constant degrees of concavity (D(Q) = D and U(Q) = U).6
Proposition 1 Within the symmetric case (m = n) and under constant degrees of concavity
at both levels, a merger of s downstream rms is more protable than a merger of s upstream
rms if and only if U  D:
Proof. See Appendix B.
In this framework, comparing the ratios boils down to comparing the degree of concavity
of the nal demand, D, with U. When U  D, the downstream ratio is higher than
the upstream one, thus a merger is more protable and incentives to merge are higher
downstream than upstream.7
In a framework where the downstream degree of concavity is constant and the upstream
supply function is non-elastic (U = 0), Ziss (2005) shows that the protability of a merger
of s rms is the same in both sectors provided that there are the same number of rms in
the merging sector prior to merger. Proposition 1 extends this result to a framework where
the input supply function has a constant elasticity.
In the following proposition, we give more general circumstances under which the simple
comparison of the degrees of concavity at the upstream and downstream levels still can
sign the dierence in the protability of mergers of s rms among n in the upstream and
downstream sectors.
Proposition 2 If the degree of concavity of downstream demand D(:) is increasing, U(Q) 
D(Q) is a sucient condition for a downstream merger to be more protable than an up-
stream one. By contrast if D(:) is decreasing, U(Q)  D(Q) is a sucient condition for
an upstream merger to be more protable than a downstream one.
6Note that in this case, D(Q) = I(Q;n) = D.
7If wU
Q > 0; the results are reversed: (Q;n)  D , U  D. Note that if wU
Q = 0, U = 0 and the
protability is the same at both levels, as in Ziss (2005).
4Proof. See Appendix C.
These two propositions show that the shape of the input supply function aects the
merger incentives in a non trivial manner, depending on the degrees of concavity of the
demand functions at dierent levels.
4 The eect of a merger on vertically related rms
In this section, we proceed further towards a welfare analysis of mergers in vertically
related industries by comparing the prot losses induced by a merger of s rms at a level
of the vertical chain (e.g. among usptream rms) on the rms at the other level (e.g.
downstream). Ziss (2005) establishes that a horizontal merger at either level reduces total
welfare. Taking size eects8 into account, Allain and Souam (2006) show that, even though
downstream mergers would be more protable than upstream mergers of the same number
of rms, the latter would be more harmful since the losses inicted upon downstream rms
by an upstream merger are larger than the losses of upstream rms following a downstream
merger. This section aims to study the robustness of this result when the upstream input












. When m = n, if R is larger (resp. lower) than 1, the prot losses are
worse for the upstream (resp. downstream) rms (see Appendix D).
We rst provide a simple condition under which downstream rms suer more from an
upstream merger than the reverse, in the framework of Ziss (2005). With m = n, assume
that the input supply function is not elastic (i.e. wU
Q = 0) and that the nal demand has a
constant degree of concavity (i.e. D = I = ).
Proposition 3 With a non elastic input supply function, when the degree of concavity of
downstream demand is constant and larger than  1 (D >  1) and m = n, the reduction
of prot of downstream rms following an upstream merger is worse than the reduction in
upstream prots following a downstream merger involving the same number of rms.
Proof. We have  
U
n






m(m+1+). Thus, with m = n,
R = 1
2+D, and R < 1 i D >  1.
We now extend these results to a more general framework. Consider rst that the input
supply function is elastic, with constant degrees of concavity (D = I(Q;n) and U) and
wU












R can be greater or smaller than 1. Note rst that
n+1+
n+1+D < 1 i  < D, which is
equivalent in this case to U > D. Moreover, 1
2+D < 1 i D >  1. Besides, since wU
Q < 0,
8By assuming that the merged rm is "larger" than the others as it has access to the combined productive
































> 1. Finally, with constant degrees of
concavity, the elasticity of the input function tends to increase the ratio R. This makes the
losses of the upstream rms relatively worse than those of the downstream rms.
This result stems from the fact that a change in upstream market structure does not
have the same impact on the equilibrium wholesale price as a change in downstream market















Under constant degrees of concavity, a decrease in the number of downstream rms does
not impact the equilibrium wholesale price but increases the input wholesale price, while a
decrease in the number of upstream rms increases the equilibrium wholesale price and the
retail price.
Indeed, a merger in the downstream market reduces downstream output, therefore the
demand for intermediate good drops. This induces a decrease of upstream production, which
in turn yields an increase of the upstream input price (for wU
Q < 0). The upstream rms
thus bear an additional loss because wU increases as Q decreases. By contrast, the wholesale
price e wD remains constant since e wD
n = 0, and the downstream rms are not aected through
this channel. This eect is strenghtened when  > D (which boils down to U < D).9
Finally, if the degree of concavity of the downstream demand function is not constant,






















This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4 An increasing degree of concavity of the nal demand function enhances
the ratio R. This makes the losses of upstream rms after a downstream merger relatively
higher compared to the losses of downstream rms after an upstream merger. By contrast, a
decreasing degree of concavity tends to reduce R and makes downstream losses worse.
When the degree of concavity of the nal demand function is not constant, a downstream
merger has an impact on the wholesale equilibrium price. If the degree of concavity of nal
demand increases, a merger downstream induces a decrease in the wholesale price equilibrium
(since e wD
n > 0) that increases the prot loss of each upstream rm, through a reduction of

















< 1: In this case, downstream rms lose more than
upstream rms when U  D >  1.
6upstream margin (as wU increases and e wD decreases). By contrast, a downstream rm is
less impacted by an upstream merger since the increase of the equilibrium wholesale price is
oset by the increase of the retail price.10
Finally, it is worth noting how these results extend to asymmetric congurations (m 6= n).
When, ceteris paribus, the number of active rms in a sector increases (e.g. m), this tends to
increase R and thus makes the upstream losses relatively higher after a downstream merger.
Conversely, an increase in the number of downstream rms (n) worsens the situation of the
downstream rms after an upstream merger.
5 Conclusion
This note compares the motivations for horizontal mergers at dierent levels of a vertical
chain, and the eect of a merger on the prots of the other sector when the nal demand
function and the upstream input supply function are elastic. We show that a simple compar-
ison of the degrees of concavity of the input supply function and the nal demand function
allows to sign the dierence in the relative protability of the mergers at both levels. The
relative protability of mergers at dierent levels of a vertical chain thus depends crucially
on the elasticity of the input supply function. We also provide a simple comparison of the
relative losses of rms at some level induced by a merger at the other level when the de-
grees of concavity are constant, and we discuss the various mechanisms in action under non
constant degrees of concavity.
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i = 0: (4)
At the symmetric equilibrium, qD
i =
Q
n and the intermediate demand function faced
by upstream rms is thus:
w









n [n + 1 + 
D(Q)] < 0 (5)
w
D
n (Q;n) =  
QP0(Q)





























Q = 0 (10)





























 Let us denote e wD the equilibrium downstream wholesale price. The prot of a down-
stream rm at the equilibrium is D =

P(Q(m;n))   e wD Q(m;n)









QP0(Q) n + 1
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B. Proof of proposition 1




















The ratio is higher in the downstream market if and only if D  (Q;n). In equilibrium


















 D , U  D:
9C. Proof of Proposition 2























implies that U(Q) < D(Q). So when U(Q)  D(Q); (Q;n)  D(Q): The upstream
ratio is then higher than the downstream one and an upstream merger is more protable
than a downstream one. Using the same argument, one can show that (Q;n) < D(Q)
implies that U(Q) > D(Q); under an increasing degree of concavity.
When wU
Q > 0; the results are changed as follows: (U(Q)  D(Q)) is a sucient
condition under which an upstream merger is more protable than a downstream one under
a decreasing degree of concavity ; (U(Q)  D(Q)) is a sucient condition under which a


































e wD wU : Using the fact







































The same method yields
D
m
D =
2+D
m(m+1+).
10